The article uses a dataset of the 2010-15 Parliamentary Conservative Party (PCP) 
Introduction
There is a considerable academic literature on ministerial selection within British Government.
This article contributes to that literature by analysing ministerial selection from amongst Conservative parliamentarians within the coalition Government led by Prime Minister David Cameron between 2010 and 2015. The article creates and exploits a dataset of all Conservative parliamentarians in order to examine the relationships between membership of the parliamentary Conservative Party (PCP) and the ministerial ranks. The rationale for the article stems from the accusation of elitism levelled at Cameron's ministerial ranks. The unrepresentative claim was made by Ed Miliband who bemoaned the fact that there were as many Etonians in the Cameron Cabinet as female (HC Deb, 2013 -14, 14 February 2014 . It was also made by Conservative parliamentarian, Nadine Dorries. Overlooked for ministerial office she accused Cameron of relying on a 'narrow clique' made of a 'certain group of people' and that those people were 'arrogant posh boys' (Orr, 2012) . This paper aims to explore these issues (and others) raised by Miliband and Dorries. The paper is organised around four sections. The opening section considers the literature on ministerial selection within British government in order to position the paper and to identify its contribution to the existing literature. In the second section we outline our hypotheses before explaining issues of data collection and our methods for testing our hypotheses. The third section presents the results and identifies whether our hypotheses were substantiated. In our conclusion we summarise our key findings and relate them to areas for further research development. more important (King 1981, pp. 249-85) . This is because there is a 'high demand' for a good which is in 'short supply' and the Prime Minister is the 'monopoly supplier' (King 1991, p. 38 ). This argument is based on the following assumptions: (a) that most parliamentarians would like to secure ministerial office, and (b) having done so want to be promoted up the ministerial ladders (and equally fear dismissal) (King and Allen 2010, p. 251) .
However, within the elected parliamentary ranks the potential talent pool is smaller than might be expected (unless Prime Ministers exploit the opportunity to appoint more ministers from the House of Lords, and appoint more peers in order to make them ministers, Jones 2010, pp. 618-9) .
Prime Ministers can only consider those fellow parliamentarians who are deemed to be suitable for the demands of ministerial office (for a wider comparative discussion on constraints in ministerial selection, see Strøm, Budge and Laver, 1994) . This rules out of contention a small proportion of any parliamentary party, some because they are personally unacceptable and some are politically unacceptable. Political unacceptability relates to backbenchers who hold positions that are at odds with the party leadership and therefore cannot be incorporated into the ministerial ranks. Personal unacceptability can cover a range of issues and the Prime Minister will be made aware of these character issues through consultations with the Chief Whip and the Whips' Office (Searing 1994, pp. 240-82) . This will contribute to the removal from consideration those who drink excessively or have engaged in behaviour that would more embarrassing to the Government if exposed when a minister than a backbencher (Jones 2010, pp. 618-9) .
Suitability for ministerial office also implies competence. Backbenchers who want to be ministers have to establish their reputations in parliamentary debate in order to suggest that they have the ability to defend policies at departmental questions or when piloting legislation through Parliament. The performance of incumbent ministers is judged against their parliamentary abilities, but also against their administrative competence within their department. Are they able to follow the agreed policy objectives of the Government and successfully implement those policies within their department? Increasingly, ministers and potential ministers are assessed on their effectiveness at political communication: are they able to explain departmental policy objectives on radio and television? Is their political persona or reputation an advantage or disadvantage to their department? (Heppell 2014, p. 65) .
That complexity relates to variables beyond competence. What makes it such a complex jigsaw puzzle is the various types of balances that are expected in terms of the composition of the ministerial team vis-à-vis the parliamentary party, or even society as a whole. Balances need to be secured in terms of occupational and regional background, as well as gender, race and sexual orientation (Jones 2010, p. 621) . A balance needs to be struck in terms of the age and experience profile within the ministerial ranks. Too many ageing ministers might create a detrimental image of a decaying administration devoid of the dynamism and new ideas required to justify re-election (for example, the notorious 1962 'Night of the Long Knives' reshuffle, see Alderman 1992) . To the other extent, new parliamentarians are not usually considered for ministerial preferment because they are seen as being too inexperienced and in many cases are too young (Theakston 1987, p. 46) .
One of the most complex balancing acts for the Prime Minister relates to party management.
Backbench opinion tends to be an influence upon appointments and dismissals, and there is an assumption that the ministerial team should be ideologically representative of the parliamentary party as a whole (Kam, Bianco, Sened and Smyth 2010, p. 289, 301) . However, to buttress their position leaders will normally ensure that an appropriate proportion of colleagues who backed them for the leadership, are rewarded with ministerial office. This is a balancing act. Prime
Ministers sometimes 'err on the side of caution' and appoint the 'maximum level of personally loyal colleagues', (for example, Heath) but this needs to be 'counterbalanced' by the appointment of some 'potentially disloyal' colleagues in order to 'gain silence' (Rose 1975, p. 7) . Normally Prime Ministers would incorporate the leading figures within the party who could be viewed as 'veto players', because they possess influence and provide gravitas and need to be accommodated (Allen and Ward 2009, p. 244) . Upon entering government from opposition, new Prime Ministers have usually incorporated into their Cabinets principal opponents for the party leadership and those who have substantive followings within the parliamentary party and beyond (King and Allen 2010, pp. 256-7) .
The above analysis demonstrates that although Prime Ministerial powers of appointment might appear to be about 'command' and 'obedience', they are actually characterised by 'bargaining' given the constraints identified (Alderman 1976) . To date, the published work on ministerial selection under Cameron has been dominated by an emphasis on gender and ministerial preferment (Heppell, 2012; Annesley and Gains, 2012; Annesley, 2014 , for a wider comparative analysis see Krook and O'Brien, 2012) . However, gender is but one variable in terms of the background of Conservative parliamentarians and ministerial preferment. Currently existing research does not engage with the relevance or otherwise of other variables such as: age; education (school and university); and their constituency circumstances (i.e. location and marginality). Nor is there any systematic evaluations on ideological preferences and ministerial advancement, or whether a particular Cameron faction has been favoured (e.g. whether known backers are more likely to secure ministerial preferment). These variables form the basis of our hypotheses -see belowbecause issues relating to personal attributes (see Rose, 1975; King, 1981; and Heppell, 2012) and ideological preferences (Heppell, 2005; Kam, Bianco, Sened and Smyth, 2010) have long been identified as the central determinants of ministerial preferment. The hypothesis on marginality is included as it is a new and emerging determinant in ministerial preferment (see Martin, 2015 and Klein and Umit, 2015) .
Hypotheses, Data Collection and Methods of Assessment:
We have constructed a dataset of each member of the 2010 PCP in order to test a series of hypotheses about ministerial preferment. If Cameron was so narrow in his approach between 2010 and 2015 then we can make the following assumptions that can form the bases of a set of hypotheses:
H1 Cameron will favour Conservative parliamentarians in the 41-50 age bracket as his preference will be for ministers in his own age bracket.
H2
Cameron will favour Conservative parliamentarians who attended private schools as he will have greater faith in those from elitist backgrounds.
H3
Cameron will favour Conservative parliamentarians who attended elite Universities as Cameron will have greater faith in those with higher educational attainment levels, most notably those from an Oxbridge educational background.
H4
Cameron will favour Conservative parliamentarians from southern constituencies as he holds one himself and the south represents the Conservative heartlands.
H5 Cameron will favour Conservative parliamentarians with larger parliamentary majorities as he will want those with marginal constituencies to concentrate on retaining their seats at the next general election.
The final three hypotheses are more complex than the earlier five. Here we want to test some ideological and leadership issues relating to Cameron. These hypotheses thereby deviate slightly from the elitist assumptions underpinning the earlier five. They are that: H6 Cameron will favour Conservative parliamentarians who share his social liberalism.
H7 Cameron will despite his public pronouncements on feminisation remain elitist in his mind-set and thus will show a disproportionate bias in favour of men when selecting ministers. would have virtually all been offered ministerial office -this is tied to the tradition that newly elected MPs are not trusted with ministerial office immediately. However, once in coalition Cameron had around twenty 'bruised egos' to contend with as shadow spokespeople from opposition missed out on ministerial posts to Liberal Democrats. Furthermore, many who did receive ministerial preferment did so at a lower level than they had anticipated (Jones 2010, p. 620) .
H8
[2] Thus, the demand for ministerial preferment remained constant but the supply was limited from a Conservative perspective. From an intra-party perspective this means the choices that Cameron made were even more significant. Second, part of the analysis is based upon ideological profiling and the research necessary to create the datasets for the 2015 PCP cannot be completed until the new Conservative parliamentarians can be assessed -i.e. by parliamentary divisions; by EDMs; by more public statements.
Before we proceed we should stress two further caveats. The first is that our focus is on establishing bias in Cameron's ministerial selection in terms of the relationship between his choices and the composition of the PCP. Thus our focus is on ministerial selection from the talent pool available to Cameron, whilst acknowledging, for example, that it is socially unrepresentative and that for example, 48 female Conservative parliamentarians out of 305, is an issue that has justifiably fuelled academic critiques of the party (Childs and Webb 2012; Hill 2013) . Our second caveat relates to fact that we believe that background variables should influence ministerial selection, but we are not claiming Cameron has proactively and deliberately sought to over-promote and underrepresent different groupings. Rather, what we are doing is merely identifying the trends in ministerial preferment vis-à-vis background variables.
Some of these variables require further explanation in terms of their coding within the dataset. -1930-39; 1940-49; 1950-59; 1960-69; 1970-79; and 1980-89 (Heppell and Hill 2009, pp. 388-99) . We coded members of the 2010 PCP who were in the previous Parliament (2005-10) through this. However, we were unable to code those newly elected members in 2010. Thus members were coded as Cameron backers; non-Cameron, or if newly elected in 2010 they were coded as not applicable.
Date of birth was differentiated by decades

Research Findings
Table one provides an outline of the composition of the 2010 PCP in relation to all of the themes that inform the hypotheses. This covers all of the variables within our dataset. The dataset was then exploited in an attempt to test the validity of our hypotheses.
The Pearson Chi-Square test was selected as one of our methods as in each of the hypotheses one dependent variable (i.e. whether someone is a Minister or not) could be compared against one independent variable (e.g. their date of birth), and both the dependent and independent variables involved categorical data. This enabled us to compare the frequencies in certain categories (e.g. the number of Conservatives born in the 1950s who were chosen to be ministers) to the number you might expect to get in those categories, and thus to identify an association between the two categorical variables. When using this method, there were cases where the sample size would be too small and the sampling distribution too deviant for the Chi-Square distribution to be robust.
Where this was the case we used the Fisher Exact Test to calculate the exact probability of the Chi-Square statistic, and in cases where there were more than two categories we used Cramer's V to measure the strength of association between the variables. The electoral marginality hypotheses (H5) -i.e. that Cameron would show a disproportionate bias in favour of Conservative parliamentarians with larger parliamentary majorities was supported.
Our hypothesis was constructed on two assumptions. First, Cameron would favour for ministerial office those who had prior parliamentary experience, and many of the more marginal constituencies would have been acquired as part of the 100 gains made at the 2010 General
Election. Second, we assumed that Cameron would also prefer candidates holding the more marginal constituencies to concentrate their efforts on retaining those seats, rather than being absorbed in ministerial work to the perceived neglect of their constituents. Table 7 shows the findings from our Fisher Exact Test and this demonstrates that relative to the expected distribution of ministerial rewards, Cameron showed a bias in favour of Conservatives with majorities over 5000 and especially 10000 and a bias against Conservative with majorities lower than 5000. The Fisher Exact Test (that we employed as some categories had low counts)
demonstrates a highly significant correlation: FET=43.592, p<0.001, which is reaffirmed by the Cramer's V calculation: Cramer's V=0.374, p<0.001. Party leadership election (H8). Our sixth hypothesis was based on the assumption that there would be an ideological dimension to Cameron's ministerial preferences -i.e. that he would skew ministerial selection and we would find evidence of a disproportionate favouring of those who shared his social liberalism, (and thus a skewing away from traditional social conservatives). As there were no small categorisations within this dataset the assumptions of the Chi-Square were met and we used the Pearson Chi-Square calculation: Chi=1.271, df=2, p=0.530. We also employed Cramer's V which had a finding of Cramer's V=0.065, p=0.530 which confirmed that we can reject H6 as there was no significant association between social liberalism and being appointed to ministerial office. Oxbridge backgrounds, and he also skewed his appointment disproportionately in favour of those who held safer constituencies.
Given that six of our 'elitist' based hypotheses regarding the composition of the ministerial ranks vis-à-vis the PCP have been disproven we offer the following concluding claim. Media driven accounts that suggest the Conservative ministerial ranks are unrepresentative and elitist are a reflection of candidate selection processes (that Cameron has only indirect control over), rather than Cameron's ministerial choices. The problem is reflective of institutional bias endemic to the Conservative Party as a whole (a structural explanation), and has not been exacerbated further by the choices of Cameron as Prime Minister (an agency based explanation).
Let us turn our attention to our second concluding question: how valuable are our findings to the academic literature on the Conservative ministers under the Prime Ministerial tenure of Cameron?
Our findings make a significant contribution because the existing literature on ministerial selection have thus far been dominated by one background variable, gender and the one-third commitment (see Annesley and Gains 2012; Heppell 2012; Annesley 2014) . Other areas on ministerial selection -portfolio distribution and reshuffles (Heppell 2014) or ideological disposition (Heppell 2013) , have shown scant interest in social background variables.
Our third and final concluding question considers the value of the data that underpins this research and whether they can be drive forward future research on ministerial selection or on the Conservative Party. Here our argument is that the data provides scholars with various potential avenues for further research development. Our approach could be re-applied to consider promotions and dismissals, rather than bundling the categorisations as being a minister at some time in the Parliament or not. Equally it could be argued that being a minister or not may be a distinction that requires further refinement. Thus, the dataset could be re-applied to consider the prestige of the ministerial office by drawing a distinction between Cabinet and junior level ministerial appointments. Furthermore, our approach could be re-applied to focus in exclusively This would be a useful academic exercise as it would reaffirm (or challenge) the central finding of the this paper -i.e. that perceptions of the Conservative Party as elitist apply with equal merit to the PCP as they do Conservative ministers. Their elitist image problem can only be addressed through changes to candidate selection rather than ministerial selection.
Notes
[1] Indicative single country studies and comparative analyses are provided by Dumont, 2009, 2015; O'Malley, 2006; Kenig and Barnea, 2009; and Kerby, 2009 .
[2] This type of comment characterised much of the published work that does exist on how Cameron selected coalition era ministers (on the wider debate on Prime Ministerial constraints in coalition see Bennister and Heffernan 2012) . The emphasis is on debating proportionality (the numbers of Conservatives vis-à-vis Liberal Democrat ministers) or the prestige of the portfolios between the parties; or the renegotiation of those numbers and prestige when reshuffles occur (see, Quinn, Bara and Bartle 2011; Debus 2011; Bäck, Debus and Dumont, 2011) .
